THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON
THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF FILINGS AND REMOVALS
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGINGt

This Article presents preliminaryfindings from the FederalJudicial Center's (FJC)study of the impact of the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 (CAFA)
on filings and removals of class actions in the federal courts. After setting the
FJC research in the context of the Judicial Conference's evolving position with
respect to expanded federal court jurisdiction over class actions, the Article
shows that the monthly average number of diversity of citizenship class actions

filed in or removed to the federal courts has approximately doubled in the postCAFA period (February18, 2005, through June 30, 2006). The Article also
presents preliminaryfindings on trends in federal question class action filings
and removals, class action activity by nature-of-suit categories, and the geographicdistribution of class actionfilings and removals in the federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article presents empirical findings on the effects of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)' on the federal courts. Looking
at filing patterns before and after CAFA, these preliminary findings
focus primarily on what is knowable this early in CAFA's life: namely,
what effect, if any, the Act has had in adding class actions to the federal dockets, whether in the form of new filings, removals, or both.
Analysis of CAFA's impact on litigation practices-with the possible
exception of remand activity in removed cases-will have to await the
termination of cases filed or removed after CAFA went into effect.
Part I of this Article describes the evolving judicial branch policies
that were a central part of CAFA's enactment and that provide a context for many of the empirical issues to be studied. Part II outlines the
purposes of CAFA and its major statutory provisions as a framework
for identifying expectations of the Act's proponents and of Congress,
as well as for identifying research questions. Where empirical findings
from prior studies are available, we summarize them. This Part also
addresses predictions of CAFA's overall effect on the federal courts'
caseload. Part III presents the research design of the ongoing Federal
Judicial Center (FJC) study of CAFA's impact on the federal courts,
and provides highlights of its preliminary findings on class action activity in the federal courts before and after CAFA's effective date. To
date, the FJC study has found an increase in diversity class action filings and removals in the federal courts. The observed increase is consistent with the expectations of the judicial branch, members of Con] Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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gress, and proponents and opponents of CAFA, though our findings
may represent a less dramatic increase than some anticipated. These
findings describe changes in the number and types of cases filed in
and removed to the federal district courts and include analysis of filings and removals in district courts, organized by circuits. Part IV
then briefly identifies questions for continuing research, including
questions to be addressed in the FJC's ongoing study and possible
questions for other researchers, particularly at the state level.
I. EVOLUTION OFJUDICIAL BRANCH POLICIES

CAFA was signed into law on February 18, 2005, after years of contentious debate. Public attention focused on the arguments advanced
by proponents of the controversial legislation, typically corporations
and organizations representing business interests, and by its opponents, typically plaintiffs' attorneys and organizations representing
consumers, employees, and other class litigants. Proponents of the
legislation generally claimed that existing law allowed plaintiffs' attorneys to choose any state forum in which to litigate nationwide class action claims. Self-interest, the argument went, led to the filing of such
cases in so-called 'Judicial hellholes, ''2 state courts predisposed to certify nationwide classes, sometimes hastily and without an opportunity
for a hearing. The proposed solution was to expand federal jurisdictional and removal statutes to allow almost all class actions to be removed to and litigated in the federal courts. Opponents of the legislation generally defended the status quo as supporting the rights of
states to enforce their own laws. Opponents also emphasized the importance of the class action device as a remedy for legal wrongs too
trivial to support individual lawsuits. Some opponents expressed
alarm at the potential addition of thousands of cases to the federal
courts' dockets.
Dating back to legislative proposals to alter class action jurisdiction and removal provisions in the 1990s, the federal judiciary has
shown an understandably keen interest in class action legislation. The
proposed changes, after all, involved a potentially dramatic expansion
of federal jurisdiction and a consequent increase in the federal
caseload. But the consequences of expanded federal jurisdiction look
2 The term 'Judicial hellhole" appears to have been created by the American Tort

Reform Association and was used extensively during the CAFA debates. See Am. Tort
Reform Ass'n, Judicial Hellholes 2007, http://uww.atra.org/reports/hellholes (last
visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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quite different when viewed from divergent perspectives. From a
purely administrative perspective, the resulting increase in complex
cases seemed dangerous, threatening to consume scarce judicial resources and to place additional pressures on an already overburdened
federal judiciary. From a federalism perspective, expanded federal jurisdiction appeared as a different kind of threat, one potentially
sweeping into the federal courts many class actions that really do not
belong there, i.e., those involving claims of state residents based
purely on state laws, cases arguably within the state courts' proper
domain. From a national perspective, the expansion of federal jurisdiction could potentially serve important functions by providing for
aggregation and by facilitating the efficient and fair national resolution of class actions raising issues affecting more than the interests of
any single state. Under any of these perspectives, however, and in
whatever terms they were expressed, the expansion of federal jurisdiction as a result of the legislative proposals was a legitimate cause for
judicial branch interest and even concern.
During this lengthy legislative battle, little public attention was
paid to the policy pronouncements of the federal judiciary. That is
not to say that the legislature ignored the judicial branch's position.
On the contrary, the judicial branch's final policy appears to have enabled some legislators and other participants to forge a compromise
between the proponents and opponents of class action legislation.
The principles asserted by the judicial branch serve as a conceptual
backdrop for understanding the limits of the legislation and also provide an underpinning for the research that the FJC is conducting at
the request of a number of committees of the Judicial Conference of
the United States (JCUS). We outline here the evolution of theJCUS
policies in order to put our research into context.
The logical starting point, given the related concerns of caseload
and federalism, is the JCUS's official position with respect to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Beginning in 1977, the Conference expressed its general support for abolishing diversity jurisdiction. 3 In so doing, the JCUS viewed the expansion (or simply the
scope) of federal jurisdiction primarily from the administrative perspective, although federalism concerns also played a role. The JCUS

3 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED
STATES 8-9 (Mar. 1977).
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continued to express its anti-diversityjurisdiction position throughout
the 1970s and 1980s.4
In the 1990s, though, the JCUS began to carve out exceptions to
that general position. In 1989 the Chief Justice, following congressional direction, appointed the Federal Courts Study Committee, a diverse group of judges, attorneys, and legislators, to study the issues
then facing the federal judiciary. In its report, the Committee expressed an appreciation for the national dimensions of complex litigation, recognizing a role for the federal courts in cases raising issues
that transcend the interests of any single state." The Committee recommended that "Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship to complex multi-state litigation, interpleader,
and suits involving aliens." 6 The stated rationale for the complex litigation exception, allowing diversity jurisdiction, was that in cases "involving scattered events or parties and substantial claims by numerous
plaintiffs[,] ... the national reach of a federal court would enable a
single forum to resolve disputes involving multiple parties from many
states. ' , 7 In short, the Federal Courts Study Committee viewed the
question of federal jurisdiction from the national perspective when it
examined the complex litigation issue, even as it employed the administrative or federalism perspectives in other contexts.
In the 1995 long-range plan for the federal courts, the JCUS reiterated its opposition to diversity jurisdiction in general, asserting in
the accompanying commentary that "[p]erhaps no other major class
of cases has a weaker claim on federal judicial resources."' But at the
same time, the long-range plan noted the Conference's prior support
for legislation that would establish "'minimal' diversity criteria to allow
federal court consolidation of multiple litigation involving personal
injury or property damage arising out of a single event."9 The Conference concluded, "the federalism principles counseling against federal litigation of state-law matters do not require abolition of diversity
4JCUS,

LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 31 & n.13 (1995).

The conference also suggested ways to limit the extent of diversity jurisdiction-e.g., by treating corporations "as 'citizens' of every state in which they are licensed or registered to
do business." Id. at 31.
5 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIFEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY

COMMrITEE 39-45 (1990).
6 Id. at 38.
7 Id. at
40.
8 JCUS, supra note 4,
at 30.
9

Id. at 31 n.1 6 (citing REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE UNITED STATES 21-22 (Mar. 1988)).
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jurisdiction in all cases," and noted the suggestion "that Congress consider extending diversity jurisdiction in ways that could facilitate the efficient consolidation and resolution of mass tort litigation.""' In 1995,
then, the JCUS chose to view these issues from the national perspective, weighing possible advantages of an expansion of federal jurisdiction against possible administrative and federalism concerns, and
coming down in support of some expansion of federal jurisdiction to
serve national ends.
But the Conference sometimes saw things from a different angle,
even on closely related issues. In 1999, the JCUS, acting on a recommendation from its Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction, expressed its opposition to legislation then pending in Congress "that
would have expanded federal jurisdiction over class action litigation
by permitting, through the use of minimal diversity of citizenship, the
initial filing in or removal to federal court of almost all such actions
now brought in state court."" The JCUS expressed concern that the
proposed legislation "was inconsistent with principles of federalism
'
and would add substantially to the workload of the federal courts. ,12
Viewing the legislation from the federalism and administrative perspectives, the Conference emphasized the general role of the state
courts in handling class action litigation, as well as caseload concerns.
Interestingly, the 1999 JCUS resolution made no distinction between
intrastate and multistate class actions, that is, between cases affecting
primarily the laws and interests of a single state and those transcending the interests of a single state.
During the same time period, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules maintained a serious interest in the pending class action legislation. That interest grew out of a long-term comprehensive study, begun in 1992, of the workings of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23."3

10

Id. at 31.

11 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED

STATES 13 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter JCUS 2003 RESOLUTION] (citing REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (Sept. 1999)).
12 Id.
13 Memorandum from Hon. David F. Levi to Civil Rules Advisor), Comm. 4-5
(Apr.
24, 2002) (on file with authors). Judge Levi became chair of the parent body, the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, after the former chair, the Honorable
AnthonyJ. Scirica, became Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in 2003.
In commissioning the Center's 1994-1995 study of class action litigation, the Advisory Committee asked the FJC to look for, inter alia, cases in which claims similar to
those raised in class actions were raised in other cases in state or federal courts. The
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Prior to its spring 2002 meeting, District Judge David F. Levi, then
chair of the Committee, wrote a memorandum to the Committee
summarizing the group's exploration of problems relating to duplicative and overlapping class actions filed
in state and federal courts, fre'4
quently including multistate claims. Citing the Committee's extensive decade-long study, Judge Levi summarized its finding that
overlapping and duplicating class actions in federal and state court create serious problems that: (a) threaten the resolution and settlement of
such actions on terms that are fair to class members, (b) defeat appropriate judicial supervision, (c) waste judicial resources, (d) lead to forum
shopping, (e) burden litigants with the expenses and burdens of multiple litigation of the same issues, and (f) place conscientious counsel at a
potential disadvantage.

Judge Levi reported the Committee's conclusion that, after "close
consideration" of several proposed amendments to Rule 23, such proposals "test the limits of the Committee's authority under the Rules
Enabling Act."' 6 Instead of proceeding with any of the proposed rule
amendments, he recommended that the Rules Committees and the

reporter to the Committee framed the request in terms of a "race to file" competing
and overlapping class actions in different courts. Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 45, 51 (1996). FJC researchers responded with data documenting the numbers of consolidated and related cases in the
four federal district courts studied. Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & RobertJ.
Niemic, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Rule 23 To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 74, 85-87 (1996). The Center found state court cases with similar claims in 1%
to 3% of all class actions in four federal district courts during the study period. Id. at
87. Of those class actions, five appeared to involve overlapping classes. Id. at 166.
14 Memorandum from Hon. David F. Levi
to Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra
note 13, at 4-5.
15

id. at 15-16.

16

Id. at 16. The proposed amendments would
have

(1) allow[ed] a court that has denied certification of a class action to preclude
later courts from adjudicating the certification issue [in the same matter];
(2) allow[ed] a court to prevent settlement shopping by precluding attempts
to persuade another court to approve a class-action settlement that has been
rejected; and (3) provide[d] a court with broad discretion to bar class members from pursuing overlapping class action litigation in other courts.
Minutes of Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 22-23 (Jtne
10-11, 2002) [hereinafter June Minutes]. Those proposals had been included in
Professor Ed Cooper's Reporter's Callfor Infornal Comment: OverlappingClass Actions of
September 2001, availableat http://wV,.Liscourts.gov/rules/comment2002/ReporterCall_forComment.pdf, which was communicated to the bench, bar, and academic
communities. The Advisory Committee convened a special meeting in October 2001
at the University of Chicago Law School to discuss and debate the proposals. SeeJune
Minutes, supra, at 23 (describing the debate).
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Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction jointly support the proposed
legislative "concept of minimal diversity [jurisdiction] for large multistate class actions, in which the interests of no one state are paramount, with appropriate limitations or threshold requirements so that
the federal courts are not unduly burdened and
the states' jurisdiction
17
over in-state class actions is left undisturbed."
After considerable debate, the committees agreed, on the eve of
the Judicial Conference meeting in March 2003, to support the concept of minimal diversity for large multistate class actions.' At that
meeting, the JCUS adjusted its position regarding CAFA, adopting a
resolution stating that "the use of minimal diversity of citizenship may
be appropriate to 'the maintenance of significant multi-state class action litigation in the federal courts."' 9 The resolution went on to "oppose class action .legislation that contains jurisdictional provisions that
are similar to those in the bills introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses, and encouraged Congress
to include sufficient limitations and threshold requirements so that federal courts are not unduly burdened and states' jurisdiction over in-state
class actions is left undisturbed, such as by employing provisions to raise
the jurisdictional threshold and to fashion exceptions to such jurisdiction that would preserve a role for the state courts in the handling of in21
state class actions.

The 2003 resolution, the product of extensive discussions between the
JCUS Committee on Rules and the JCUS Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction, 2 reflected a new synthesis of the administrative, federalism, and national perspectives. The Conference, through the give-

17June Minutes, supranote
16, at 24.
18 Telephone Interview with Hon. AnthonyJ. Scirica, Chief
Judge, U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit and former Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules (Dec. 28,
2007).
19JCUS 2003 RESOLUTION, supra note 11,
at 14.
20 Id. The bills being referred to here were almost identical
to each other and
provided a jurisdictional threshold of $2 million, minimal diversity of citizenship (i.e.,
between a single class member and a single defendant), and the following exceptions:
(1) where a substantial majority of a proposed plaintiff class and the primary defendants are all citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed and the law of
that state will primarily govern the action; (2) where "the primary defendants are
States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court
may be foreclosed from ordering relief"; or (3) where "the number of proposed class
members is less than 100." H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (as passed by House, Mar. 14,
2002); S. 353, 106th Cong. (as reported by Senate, Feb. 3, 1999).
21 JCUS 2003 RESOLUTION, supra note 11, at 14.
22

Id. at 13.
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and-take of its committees, had found a way to balance the competing
concerns of caseload, the interests of the states in protecting their own
citizens, and the advantages of a federal forum for aggregation and
resolution of multistate class actions.
During the spring of 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed S.274, the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,23 and
amended it to add restrictions on the expansion of minimal diversity
jurisdiction. The changes appear to be designed to implement the
JCUS suggestion to incorporate in the statute "sufficient limitations
and threshold requirements" to protect both the state and federal
courts' interests. The marked-up version of S. 274 increased the
threshold amount in controversy for aggregated class claims from
$2 million to $5 million, 24 eliminated federal jurisdiction when twothirds of the members of the proposed class and the primary defendants are citizens of the state of original filing,' and gave district
judges discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction when more than
one-third and fewer than two-thirds of the members of a proposed
class and the primary defendants are citizens of the original filing
state. 26 The Judiciary Committee's bill continued to exempt from the
jurisdictional changes all class actions in which (1) the primary defendants are states, state officials, or other governmental entities against
whom the court may be foreclosed from ordering relief; or (2) the
proposed class has fewer than 100 members.27
After the Committee mark-up, but before the bill was reported to
the full Senate, Senator PatrickJ. Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote to the JCUS and asked for legislative language to implement the Conference's March 2003 recommen28
dations.
The Secretary to the JCUS responded that the JCUS had
carefully stated its position in terms of general principles and "avoided
specific legislative language, out of deference to Congress's judgment
and the political process," noting that the "issues implicate fundamental interests and relationships that are political in nature and are pecu-

S. 274, 108th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Feb. 4, 2003).
S.274, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (as reported by the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
June 2, 2003).
23
24

25

Id. § 4(a) (4) (A).

Id. § 4(a) (3) (listing five factors to consider in exercising that discretion).
Id. § 4(a) (4) (B), (C).
28 See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y,
JCUS, to Senator Patrick J.
Leahy (Apr. 25, 2003) (referencing Senator Leahy's letters of April 9, 2003, and April
11, 2003) (copy on file with authors).
26

27
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Nonetheless the JCUS confirmed

that it had
no objection to proposals: (1) to increase the threshold jurisdictional
amount in controversy for federal minimal diversity jurisdiction; (2) to
increase the number of all proposed plaintiff class members required for
maintenance of a federal minimal-diversity class action; and (3) to confer upon the assigned district judge the discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a minimal-diversity federal class action if whatever criteria imposed by the statute are satisfied.30

The Class Action Fairness Act of 200531 incorporated the primary
features of the 2003 proposal, including the provisions added in the
Senate's markup of S. 274, as discussed above. Congress adopted the
2005 bill on February 17, 2005, and the legislation went into effect
immediately upon the President's signing it into law the next day.
The Senate Report referred to the JCUS's "significant shift in position" and its recognition that "the use of [expanded] diversity jurisdiction may be appropriate to the maintenance of significant multi-state
class action litigation in the federal courts.,32
CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction raises a series of largely
normative questions: Which courts should resolve class actions that
will directly affect citizens of multiple states? What is the proper role
of the federal courts in handling multistate class actions, which by
definition involve the interests of citizens of many, and perhaps all,
states? The judiciary's concerns about caseload were balanced by its
own interest in finding solutions to the problems associated with multiple and overlapping class action litigation in the state and federal
courts. Yet the judiciary continued to have concerns about caseload,
and those empirically based concerns provided the impetus for the
present study.
The evolution of views within the judicial branch also points to
questions beyond whether CAFA has resulted in the expected increase
in class action activity in the federal courts. The final point made in
the JCUS resolution and in its letter to Senator Leahy emphasized that
any legislation should not "'unduly intrude on state courts or burden

29 Id. at 3.
30

Id.

31 Pub.

L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
S. REP. No. 109-14, at 12 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Leonidas
Ralph Mecham to Senator Patrick]. Leahy, supra note 28, at 3).
32
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federal courts.' ' 3 3 This two-pronged standard raises a number of empirical questions: Do the limitations and jurisdictional parameters of
CAFA protect the interests of the states by leaving intrastate class actions in the state courts, while at the same time facilitating removal of
multistate class actions to the federal courts? Do the definitions of local controversies and the criteria for limiting federal jurisdiction
based on the citizenship of class members accomplish their intended
goal of keeping local controversies in the state courts? What is the distribution of citizenship of members of class actions that are filed in or
removed to federal courts after CAFA? Is the removal-remand mechanism an adequate filter for separating intrastate from multistate class
actions? Are the amount-in-controversy and size-of-class limitations
workable in a system that typically makes jurisdictional decisions before discovery is undertaken, or will application of those limits impose
an undue burden on the federal courts? The FJC study, when completed, will address these and other questions relating to the operation of CAFA.
II. PURPOSES OF CAFA AND EXPECTATIONS
ABOUT ITS PROBABLE EFFECTS

Congress's findings regarding CAFA's jurisdictional provisions, its
statement of purpose, and its other statutory terms parallel the jurisdictional principles espoused by the Judicial Conference discussed in
Part I. In this Part we detail those components of CAFA to provide a
framework for our empirical findings, discussed in Part III.
A. JurisdictionalFindings,Purposes, and Statutory Terms
1. Jurisdictional Provisions
Congress explicitly found that "[a]buses in class actions undermine the national judicial system" because "State and local courts
are... keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court...
[and] making judgments that impose their view of the law on other
States and bind the rights of the residents of those States. 34 CAFA asserts that a primary purpose of the statute is to "provid[e] for Federal

33 Letter from Leonidas Ralph Meacham to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, supra note
28, at 3.
4CAFA § 2(a) (4) (A), (C), 28 U.S.C. § 1711
note (Supp. V 2005).
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court consideration of3 interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction."

5

CAFA pursued that primary goal by making it easier both for
plaintiffs to establish federal jurisdiction in original federal class actions and for defendants to remove class actions from the state courts.
The mechanisms for bringing cases into the federal courts include
creating a new minimal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction for class actions and expanding the opportunity for removal of a class action
from state to federal court. The statute, however, incorporates a
number of threshold criteria that restrict the new jurisdictional terms
to cases likely to have substantial importance, as manifested by the
amount in controversy and the size of the class. In effect, under
CAFA, the number of claimants and the aggregate amount of their
claims serve as surrogates for the importance of a case. Thus, when
"any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from
any defendant," there is original federal jurisdiction for any class action in which "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000.,,36
What impact is the amount in controversy likely to have? While
there does not appear to be empirical information specifically focused
on the amount in controversy as measured at the outset of class action
litigation, there is empirical information on the amount of the outcomes (primarily settlements) in class action litigation in federal
courts. A 2003 FJC survey of attorneys in recently terminated class actions yielded a finding that the median recovery in class action settlements was $800,000 and that 75% of the settlements were valued at
less than $5.2 million.3 ' Those findings suggest that the $5 million
Id. § 2(b)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2005).
37 Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum
in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 591, 650 (2006)
[hereinafter Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice]; see also THOMAS E. WILLGING c
SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF AT-LORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 51 (2005) [hereinafter WILLGING & WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION], available at http://www.jc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Clacto5.pdf (reporting the same data); NICHOLAS M. PACE ET
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
52 (2007) (finding that in 32 insurance class actions filed between 1992 and 2002 the
"common fund was less than $5 million in size in 62.5 percent of the reported cases").
RAND researchers extrapolated that
35

36

[i]f indeed 62.5 percent of interstate cases (i.e. those with a multistate class or
a foreign defendant) had a value of less than $5 million as suggested by our
limited data on settlement funds, then just 33 percent of state insurance class
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CAFA limit might exclude a substantial majority of class actions, depending on the relationship between the amount in controversy and
the final settlement amount. One might, of course, reasonably expect
that the amount in controversy would be higher than the amount of
settlement because the settlement implies that the parties had compromised higher claims. Yet no empirical study documents the
amount in controversy in class action litigation.
CAFA's jurisdictional provisions regarding the size of the class are
also designed to restrict federal filings and removals to only the largest
and presumably most important classes. CAFA's minimal diversity jurisdiction does not apply to classes in which "the number of members
of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 100. " 3 "

Empirical research suggests, however, that the 100-class-member restriction will have limited effect. The 2003 FJC survey found that the
median size of class actions removed to federal courts and retained in
the face of a motion to remand was 1000 members.39 That survey also
found, counterintuitively, that the median size of class actions that
federal judges remanded to state courts was much larger-5000 members. 40 Median settlement values we're also higher in the state class actions ($850,000 compared to' $300,000), but the median recovery per
class member was higher in federal court ($517) than in state court
($350) .41These findings suggest the possibility that, before CAFA, state
courts were more likely than federal courts to have jurisdiction over
multistate diversity class actions with larger amounts at stake. CAFA's
reach-in relation to the size of the class and, perhaps, the amount in
controversy-is certainly wide enough to capture those class actions and
allow them to be filed in or removed to the federal courts.
2. Jurisdictional Exceptions
CAFA's multilayered formula for dealing with the citizenship of
class members, dubbed the "home-state exception," seems designed to
leave some single-state cases in the state courts, reserving federal juaction filings would be removable under CAFA, compared with 89 percent if
the threshold issue is ignored.

Id. at 61.
M 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (5) (B) (Supp. V 2005).
39 Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice,
supra note 37, at 639; see also WILLGING &
WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 37, at 40 (reporting the same
data).
40 Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice, supra note 37,
at 639.
41 Id.
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risdiction for cases that have more of a national or multistate character. First, CAFA's minimal diversity provision applies by inference
whenever fewer than one-third of the members of the proposed class
(or classes, if multiple classes are proposed) are citizens of the home
42
state. Such cases belong in federal court, the Senate Report asserts,
"because they have a predominantly interstate component-they affect people in many jurisdictions, and the laws of many states may be
at issue.,43
-

If between one-third and two-thirds of the class members, as well
as the primary defendants, are citizens of the state in which the action
was filed, a federal court may decline to exercise CAFAjurisdiction after considering six statutory factors. 4 Five of those six factors explicitly point to national and federalism concerns, directing the court to
examine whether "the claims asserted involve matters of national or
interstate interest," "the claims asserted [would] be governed by laws
of the [forum] State ... " the forum state has "a distinct nexus with
the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants," "the number
of citizens of the [forum] State

...

is substantially larger than the

number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the
other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial
number of States," and "1 or more other class actions asserting the
same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have
been filed."" These pointed references to national and federalism
factors seem tailored to the principles put forth by theJCUS.
Likewise, CAFA'sjurisdictional matrix is designed to keep local instate class actions in state courts. A federal court must decline to exercise CAFA jurisdiction if "two-thirds or more of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally

42 S.

REP. No. 109-14, at 36, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 35; see also Sarah S.

Vance, A Primer on the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1622 &
n.34 (2006) ("There is likewise no exception to jurisdiction if one-third or fewer of the
class members are citizens of the original forum ....
").
43 S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36, as reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 35.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (3) (Supp.
V 2005).
45 Id. § 1332(d) (3) (A), (B), (D)-(F). The sixth factor-"whether
the class action has
been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid federal jurisdiction," id. § 1332(d) (3) (C)implicitly involves federalism concerns that might be evident in carving up a natural
class into "a class that appears to be gerrymandered solely to avoid federal jurisdiction
by leaving out certain potential class members or claims." S. REP. No. 109-14, at 37, as
reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 36.
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filed., 4r Along similar lines, a district court must decline federal jurisdiction under some circumstances even if only a single defendant
is a citizen of the forum state so long as that defendant's conduct
formed a "significant basis for the claims asserted" and the plaintiff
seeks "significant relief' from that defendant. 47 The latter exception,
however, applies only where the "principal injuries" resulted from conduct that occurred in the state and where no other class action had
asserted "the
same or similar factual allegations against any of the de49
fendants."
Whether these jurisdictional carve-outs preserve state court jurisdiction over in-state class actions remains to be seen. That issue is included in the empirical inquiry the Center has undertaken. But, as
discussed below, the most direct measure-whether significant numbers of in-state class actions continue to be filed in state courts and either are not removed or, if removed, remanded pursuant to CAFAdepends to a large extent on the availability of data showing state
court activity before and after CAFA went into effect.
3. Judicial Interpretations of CAFA
The jurisdictional issues summarized above also point to a different measure of CAFA's impact on the federal courts: how much judicial time and effort will be consumed in applying the multifaceted
screening process Congress has created? This and related empirical
questions require a closer look at activity in cases filed in or removed
to the federal courts. To answer these questions, in Phase II of the
ongoing study we will examine how often, and at what length, litigants
brief and argue motions to remand, dismiss, compel discovery over
class issues, and the like. Likewise, we will document judicial responses to such motions, whether in the form of hearings or written
rulings. We will then examine whether the new jurisdictional issues
are comparable to their pre-CAFA counterparts, such as diversity of
citizenship and the amount in controversy issues, in motions to remand or motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For example, one question of interpretation that appears to have
generated a substantial amount of litigation is the locus of the burden
of proving federal jurisdiction. Despite some legislative history to the
46
47
48
49

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (4) (B).
Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (II) (aa), (bb).
Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (i) (III).
Id. § 1332(d) (4) (A) (ii).
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contrary, the burden of proving the elements of jurisdiction appears
to be on the party asserting federal jurisdiction,50 that is, the plaintiff
in an original action or the defendant in a removal proceeding.
Commentators have suggested that plaintiffs might bear the burden of
showing that a particular case falls within one of the statutory exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction, 51 and a number of courts have placed the
burden on the plaintiff in those circumstances.
In the end, the statute facilitates removal to federal court, thus ensuring that, if a defendant so chooses, a federal court will have the opportunity to apply
CAFA and determine whether there is federal jurisdiction. Again, the
impact of litigation about burden of proof issues is among those
flagged for attention in the empirical study.
4. Removal Provisions
CAFA's removal provisions make it easier to remove actions successfully by limiting the reasons for remand and providing for expedited appellate review of remand decisions. CAFA permits removals
of class actions "without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen
of the State in which the action is brought," abrogates the one-year
limitation on removal applicable to individual actions, eliminates the
need for a defendant to obtain consent from codefendants before
removing an action, and creates an opportunity for an expedited appeal of a remand order. ' Comparing the remand rate before and after CAFA will identify any impact that CAFA has had on remands.
The number of removed cases and the trends in removals before and
50See, e.g.,
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens ofJurisdictionalProof 59 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005477 (concluding that
lower court decisions construing CAFA to alter the burden for proving diversity misread the statute); Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action FairnessAct in a Truly Fair
Manner,80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1662-65 (2006) (arguing that CAFA did not change the
tradition of placing the burden on the defendant to prove diversity); Vance, supra note
42, at 1637-41 (arguing that the text, rather than legislative history, should be the focus
of interpretation, and that this supports the traditional allocation of the burden). But
see H. Hunter Twiford Ill, Anthony Rollo &John T. Rouse, CAFA's New "MinimalDiversity" Standardfor Interstate Class Actions Creates a Presumption thatJurisdictionExists, with the
Burden of ProofAssigned to the Party OpposingJurisdiction,25 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 10 (2005)
("[C]orrectly interpreted, CAFA's statutory text, purpose, and legislative history create
a presumption in favor of finding that minimal-diversity jurisdiction exists... with the
burden of proof on the party opposing jurisdiction.").
51 See, e.g.,
Vance, supranote 42, at 1640-41.
52 See, e.g.,
Frazier v. Pioneer Americas LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006);
Evans v. Walter Indus., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11 th Cir. 2006).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), (c) (Supp. V
2005).
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after CAFA will provide some indication about the rate of removal, but
firm conclusions about CAFA's effect on removal rates would require
more information on state class action activity than is presently available.
5. Class Action Settlements and Notices
Congress also found abuses in class action settlement terms and
enacted both substantive limits on class settlements and procedural
approaches to notifying public regulatory officials, thereby increasing
participation in settlement review for the protection of class members'
interests. Congress found, for example, that "[c]lass members often
receive little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes
harmed," such as when "counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving
class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value."' 4
Congress also found that "confusing notices are published that prevent class members from being able to fully understand and effectively
exercise their rights."55
To give effect to its finding that class members sometimes receive
no benefit, or might even suffer a loss, from a class settlement, Congress enacted limitations on coupon settlements designed to ensure
that class members receive fair value for their claims and that attorneys receive fees limited to a reasonable portion of the value of redeemed coupons, not their face value.56 Congress also protected any
class member who faces a loss in a settlement, by requiring that the
court enter "a written finding that nonmonetary benefits to the class
member substantially outweigh the monetary loss.",5 Center research
will document the use of coupon settlements, identify any settlements
that cost some class members more than they received, and compare
those outcomes with prior empirical data. In the Center's 2003 survey, attorneys reported that about 1% of class action settlements were
settled with nontransferable (and thus unmarketable) coupons as the
only benefit to the class and that another 4% of class action settlements provided only transferable coupons to class members.5 Prior
research has not uncovered any cases in which the monetary costs to

54 CAFA § 2 (a) (3) (A), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note.
55 Id. § 2(a)(3) (C), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note.
56

28 U.S.C. § 1712.

57

Id. § 1713.

58 WILLGING & WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 37, at 51.

additional 5% of cases included coupon recoveries as a portion of a larger recovery.

An

1740

UNIVERSITY OFPEANSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156:1723

individual class members exceeded their monetary benefit, leading
one to suspect that the infamous Bank of Boston case that led to
§ 171359 is a class of one, an anecdote based on an unusual case.
Congressional response to the notice issue was twofold. First,
Congress ratified the amendments to Rule 23 that had advanced
through the rulemaking process during the years CAFA was pending.
Those amendments in fact became law before CAFA was enacted, 0
and included a directive that notice to the class "must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language" a number of specific
items. 6' Center research will document the information included in
the notices of settlement, but will not attempt to judge
the conformity
62
standard.
language
plain
the
with
document
of the
Second, Congress directed that detailed notices of the class litigation and settlement be sent to the appropriate regulatory officials. i
Center research will document compliance with this requirement and
also document any appearance by a public official at a settlement review hearing.
B. Predictionsof CAFA 's Effects
In reviewing the 2002 version of CAFA, which included a $2 million rather than a $5 million aggregate amount in controversy, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported to Congress that "most
class-action lawsuits would be heard in a Federal district court rather
than a state court."' The CBO candidly stated that "the number of
cases that would be filed in Federal court under this bill is highly uncertain" and indicated that "CBO expects that at least a few hundred

59 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1996);
see also S.
REP. No. 109-14, at 14-15 (2005), as rlprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15 (citing Bank of
Boston as a representative case for abusive attorneys' fee awards).
60 CAFA § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 2074 note. The rule amendments went into effect on
December 1, 2003. See Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/archive.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
62 To view illustrative notices of class action certification and settlement that the

FJC prepared at the request of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, see Fed. Judicial
Ctr., The Federal Judicial Center's "Illustrative" Forms of Class Action Notices,
http://www.Oc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/
inavgeneral?openpage&url-r=-/public/home.nsf/pages/376 (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
63

28 U.S.C. § 1715.

64

Letter from Dan L. Crippen, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to F. James Sensen-

brenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar.
11, 2002), in H.R. REP. No. 107-370, at 27 (2002).
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additional cases would be heard in Federal court each year., 65 Consistent with that analysis, the CBO estimated that the bill "would not require a significant increase in the number of Federal judges, so that
any potential increase in direct spending ... would probably be less
than $500,000 a year." 66 In 2005, after the amount in controversy was
raised to $5 million and additional carve-outs (as they have come to be
called) were added, the CBO did not change its estimate of the number of cases expected to be added to federal court dockets.67
The CBO predictions are puzzling. If most of the class actions
now in the state courts were removed to federal courts, there would be
far more than the 300 new class action lawsuits estimated in the 2002
and 2005 CBO reports. FJC data from January 1996 through June
2001 found that between 1600 and 2000 non-securities class actions
were filed in the federal courts each year. 6s In the five-year period between July 1, 2001, and June 30, 2006, the ongoing FJC study found
approximately 16,700 single-case or lead-case class actions (including
securities cases), which translates to an average of 3340 class actions
per year over the entire study period.
The best available estimate of the proportion of class actions in
state courts indicates that almost 60% of all reported class action decisions occurred in the state courts. 7 Applying that proportion to the
3340 cases per year in the federal courts leads to an estimate of 8350
total cases in state and federal courts. If half of those 8350 were to

Id. at 27-28. That number of cases would impose additional costs on the courts
of about $6 million, based on an estimated cost of $20,000 to manage each class action
lawsuit (thus indicating that the "few hundred additional cases" meant 300 cases).
65

66

Id. at 28.

67 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S.5 CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF

2005 (2005), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 76-78 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 71-73.
M

BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ

ON THE FILING OF FEDERAL CIASS ACTIONS: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON

CIVIL RULES 7-8 & chart 1 (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc-catalog.nsf.
These data include only unique class actions plus the lead cases in intradistrict or multidistrict consolidations. Id. at 5.
69 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY C. LEE lII, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF

THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3 (2007),

availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CAFAThird_lnterim.pdf.
70 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, CLASS
ACTION DI-

LEMMAS:

PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 56 (2000), available at http://

In insurance class action litigawww.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR969/.
tion, which is generally based on state laws and regulations, 89% of the cases identified
by RAND researchers had been filed in state court. PACE ET. AL, supra note 37, at 21.
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end up in the federal courts, that would be 4175 cases, or an increase
of 835 cases over the current caseload. If "most" of the 8350 cases
were to end up in federal court, the increase would be dramatically
larger. If a bare majority of the estimated 5010 state court class actions were removed to federal court-or filed as original federal actions-that would add more than 2500 class actions each year to the
federal courts' dockets. In light of the above assumptions about state
court class action activity, the CBO estimate is at the low end of the
spectrum.
Critics of CAFA predicted that the 2002 version of CAFA "would
result in wholesale removal of State law class actions from State courts
to the Federal courts," causing an "epic reallocation of judicial responsibility that will further impair the ability of Federal courts to
carry out the essential functions they are to serve under the Constitution.'
CAFA will, the argument continued, "substantially expand the
caseload of the Federal courts to include hundreds, if not thousands,
of complex cases that do not involve questions of Federal law.' 7 2 The
resulting docket pressures would restrict the opportunities of plaintiffs
in civil rights actions to obtain trial dates and "would also increase
pressure on courts to dispose of class actions by denying certification
3
altogether." 7
One commentator, writing after CAFA's enactment, urged a
strong qualifier to the "sweeping" CBO prediction that most class actions would be heard in federal court: "Certainly most multistate class
actions will now be heard in federal courts., 74 That qualifier should
narrow the wide range that other forecasters have urged. Because the
range of predictions is so wide and because we have no information
on how many multistate class actions were in the state courts before
CAFA, the effect of CAFA on federal (and state) dockets remains ripe
for empirical study.

Class Action Litigation: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on theJudiciary,107th Cong.
12
(2002) (statement of Thomas J. Henderson, Chief Counsel, Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law).
72 Id.
73 Id. at
13.
74 Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1606 (2006).
71
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THE FJC STUDY

The ongoing FJC study is designed to capture the impact of CAFA
on class action activity in the federal courts by a detailed comparison
of the pre- and post-CAFA periods. The study design consists of three
major parts, or phases."' Phase I is designed to identify all class actions filed in or removed to the federal courts during the study period
(July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2007) in order to determine whether
CAFA has caused an increase in the federal caseload, as discussed
above in Parts I and II.B. All of the findings presented in this Article
relate to Phase I. At present, filing and removal data is only available
through June 30, 2006; the research team is currently updating the
class actions database to include class actions filed or removed betweenJuly 1, 2006, andJune 30, 2007.
Phase II is designed to analyze the litigation activity in a sample of
the class actions identified in Phase I of the study. Phase II will address the nature and source of law for the underlying claims, class discovery, remand motions and rulings, pretrial motions practice, class
certification motions and rulings, and the settlement process. Comparisons ofjudicial activity in class actions filed or removed both preand post-CAFA will enable us to gauge the impact of CAFA on the
federal courts' resources. Phase III is designed to analyze the litigation activity in the sampled cases in the courts of appeals. At present,
the FJC research team is collecting Phases II and III data on a sample
of pre-CAFA class actions, which will serve as a baseline for compari6
son to data to be collected on a sample of post-CAFA class actions.1
A. Research Design (PhaseI)
1. Identifying Class Actions
Multiple methods were employed to identify instances in which
class-action-related activities occurred in cases filed or removed between July 1, 2001, and June 30, 2006. The most time-consuming
method started with a text-based search of the Case Manage-

75 Memorandum from Tom Willging to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules
(Oct.
25, 2005) (on file with authors) (outlining the "proposal to study the impact of class
action fairness").
76 For a much more complete discussion of Phases 11
and Ill of the FJC study, see
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ADvISORY COMMIITEE ON CIVIL RULES

ON THE IMPAGT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 2-3 (2007), available at http://
w w.fjc.go%'/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa I 107.pdf/$file/cafal 107.pdf.
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ment/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) replication databases maintained by the courts. Members of the research team then used
CM/ECF to inspect the docket records to confirm the presence of
class action allegations in cases in which the term "class" was detected.77 Cases were kept in the database if class allegations were
raised by the plaintiffs at any point in the litigation. Cases alleging
class action status under Rule 23, derivative status under Rule 23.1,
collective action status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 7
and class action status under state procedural rules (in removed cases)
were all coded as class actions for study purposes. In most cases, class
allegations appeared in the complaint (or an amended complaint).
This visual inspection of docket records enabled the team members to
eliminate false positives, i.e., cases in which the "class" reference was
not to class action activity but instead to other uses of the word "class,"
including party names (e.g., "Touch of Class Florists" or "World Class
Distributors"). Pairs of researchers for each district conducted this inspection of docket records. When the two researchers disagreed on
whether a case met the class action criteria, a team leader resolved the
dispute. Such disputes were infrequent.
In addition to the text search, the research team examined the
docket records of cases in the replication databases in which the class
action "flag" variable (which is used by the Administrative Office (AO)
and some courts to identify class actions at case filing and at termination) indicated class allegations. The research team also examined
the docket records of cases identified as class actions in the Integrated
Data Base (IDB) maintained by the FJC, based on data provided by
the courts to the AO. The same coding rules were applied to the
"flag" and IDB-only cases as to the replication text search cases. Finally, we also included in the database all cases identified as class actions by CourtLink, an electronic service provided by LexisNexis.
CourtLink identifies class actions through its own search of docket
sheets, including a search for the terms "similarly situated" or "repre9
sentative of the class" among the parties' names in the case caption.7

77 The text-based search is designed to disregard certain common terms including
the word "class," such as "first class mail" and "class A misdemeanor." The docket records in cases with these terms (and variations on them) were not inspected unless the
text-based search detected other uses of "class."

78 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).

79 For a thorough discussion of the CourtLink database and its use in a prior FJC
study of class action filings, see NIEMIC & WILLGING, supra note 68, at 26-28.
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The use of multiple methods to identify cases in which class action
allegations were raised was, and continues to be, labor intensive, but
we believe that this wide-ranging approach has enabled us to identify a
very high percentage of all class action activity in the federal courts in
the study period. We cannot say how great a percentage of class action activity, of course. But to escape our multiple searches, a putative
class action would have to be one that evaded the CourtLink search of
case records and case captions, the CM/ECF "flag" and IDB searches,
and in which the term "class" was never used in the CM/ECF docket
records. In other words, it would have to be a case in which the terms
"class action complaint," "class allegations," "motion for class certification," "motion to certify a class," and "class settlement," among many
others, never appeared in a docket entry. We have not identified
every case, but it is probably safe to say that we have identified every
case in which there was any activity related to class action status beyond the assertion of class action allegations in the complaint.
Even if class action activity was detected in a case, it was excluded
from the analysis database under certain circumstances. Pro se matters were excluded because pro se litigants do not have authority to
represent a class. Prison litigation, in general, was excluded from the
analysis, even in the rare instances in which the plaintiffs (or habeas
petitioners) had counsel at some point in the litigation. In an early
stage of the research, we determined that the small number of counseled prisoner class actions made separate analysis impractical. Moreover, prison litigation, which in the federal courts tends to be based
on federal question jurisdiction, is unrelated to CAFA's more businessoriented purposes and should be largely unaffected by the legislation.
We also excluded cases in which an agency of the U.S. government, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission, was the plaintiff, even though the term "class" is sometimes used in such cases. The
EEOC, for example, has statutory authority
. 80 to file a civil action on behalf of a group of aggrieved complainants who might be referred to
collectively as a class, but not a Rule 23 class. 8' Like the counseled
prisoner cases and unlike the FLSA statutory opt-in class actions, we
determined at an early point in the study that there would not be
enough of these statutory class actions to warrant separate analysis.
so42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1), (2) (Supp. V 2005).
81 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980) ("Rule 23 is not
applicable to an enforcement action brought by the EEOC in its own name .... ").
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Moreover, CAFA does not affect the ability of the U.S. government to
bring such actions on behalf of statutory classes.
2. Accounting for Overlapping and Duplicative
Federal Class Actions
Following the preferences of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, the Center's study is designed to avoid double-counting "overlapping" and "duplicative" class actions in the federal courts. After
identifying the population of cases in which class action allegations
were raised, the docket records of those cases were searched a second
time for terms including "consolidate," "transfer," "related case,"
"MDL," "JPML," "conditional transfer order," and variations on those
terms. If one of the search terms appeared, two researchers visually
inspected the docket records to determine whether the case had been
consolidated with another case in the district court. For all consolidated cases, including multidistrict (MDL) transfers and interdistrict
transfers based on an order changing venue, a single "lead" case was
identified for inclusion in the study and "member" cases were identified and marked for exclusion from the analysis database.8 2 The Clerk
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) and his staff
provided statistical information that allowed us to double check
whether any of the cases we had marked as "unique" were in fact part
of an MDL consolidation. As a further check, we eliminated from the
database all cases that had been terminated by transfer to another district, whether following a transfer
order83 from the JPML or an order to
•
change venue issued by a district court.

82

For cases identified as "related," two researchers examined the record in the

case and determined whether the related cases were managed in a way that was the
equivalent of consolidated treatment.
83 A possible criticism of our study of CAFA's impact on the workload of the federal courts is that, by eliminating overlapping and duplicative class actions from the
study, we are actually understating the volume of class action activity in the federal
courts. The primary interest of the committees of the Judicial Conference, as discussed in Part I, supra, is with the workload of the federal courts. For that reason, we
take steps to avoid inflating the number of class actions identified by counting consolidated actions as multiple cases. That means in the end, however, that many filings and
removals get excluded from the analysis database. We are certain that academic researchers, with a different set of concerns from those of the judicial branch, would
pursue aspects of this research in other ways. But to assuage concerns that our reported results are somehow affected by our consolidation-data-cleaning step, we
should note that the exact same procedures were followed for both pre- and postCAFA cases, so any understatement of total class action activity in the federal courts
should be constant across the study period. Moreover, consolidated lead and MDL
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The cases in the analysis database-i.e., all unique class actions
and one lead class action for each MDL or intradistrict consolidation-were then matched to the records for these cases in the IDB using district, office, year, and sequence numbers. The IDB provides
the information on filing and termination dates, disposition, nature of
suit, basis ofjurisdiction, and origin (i.e., original proceeding or removal) in the analysis to follow, for the most part. However, because
Phase II data collection has begun, the research team has identified a
small number of miscoded cases in the IDB. These miscoded cases
have been recoded in the Center's database. Moreover, the nature-ofsuit codes found in the IDB have been collapsed into broader natureof-suit categories, and some cases coded as "Other Statutory Actions"
in the IDB have been recoded as Consumer Protection cases based on
the United States Code Title and Section variables found in the IDB.
One final caveat is necessary. This is an ongoing project, and a
number of the class actions in the analysis database are still pending
in district court. Further research, including at least one more consolidation search, may lead to further refinements of the Center's
analysis database. The findings reported below, in short, differ slightly
from figures reported in earlier reports, and findings reported in the
future may differ slightly from those reported below. The findings in
Part III.B should thus be taken as preliminary, based on the current
state of our research.
3. Determining Whether CAFA Has
Impacted the Federal Courts
As discussed in Parts I and II, CAFA's primary impact on the
caseload of the federal courts is expected to be an increase in the
number of class actions raising state-law causes of action filed in or
removed to federal court. For the most part, as discussed in this section, most of the expected increase will be in the number of class actions filed in or removed to the federal courts based on those courts'
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.

lead cases made up virtually the same proportion of the post-CAFA analysis cohort as
observed in the pre-CAFA cohort. In other words, there is no reason to believe that

the consolidation-data-cleaning step is driving our post-CAFA findings; those findings
did not result from a smaller proportion of consolidated or MDL-transferred cases in
the post-CAFA period. Indeed, the relative proportion of the consolidated lead and
MDL lead cases in the pre- and post-CAFA cohorts in the entire database, prior to the
consolidation-data-cleaning step, are also roughly the same.
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An observed increase in diversity class actions after CAFA's effective date, however, would not conclusively demonstrate that CAFA was
the cause of the increase. It could be that a certain percentage of
class actions based on state-law causes of action is more or less always
filed in or removed to the federal courts. If the overall number of
such cases increased because of factors unrelated to CAFA, the number of such cases in the federal courts would also increase, but that increase would reflect the growth in total class action activity and not a
CAFA effect. Under these conditions, CAFA would not have shifted
any class actions from the state courts to the federal courts; the proportion of state-law-based class actions in the state courts would remain unaffected by the legislation.
To demonstrate a CAFA effect on diversity cases conclusively, one
would need accurate information about class action activity in the
state courts comparable to that collected by the Center about class action activity in the federal courts. With such information, one could
determine whether the increase, if any, in the number of diversity
class actions in the federal courts coincided with a decrease in state
court class action activity. That zero-sum relationship would indicate
that CAFA is actually shifting class actions from the state courts to the
federal courts. But information on class action activity in the state
courts of this kind is not available at this time. 14
It may be possible, however, to infer a CAFA effect based solely on
an increase in class action filings and removals in diversity class actions
under certain conditions. The first such condition, obviously, is timing. Although an increase in the filing and removal of diversity class
actions that clearly occurred after CAFA's effective date, February 18,
2005, would not demonstrate a CAFA effect conclusively, it would suggest that CAFA is affecting the caseload of the federal courts. On the
other hand, an increase that occurred or at least began prior to
CAFA's effective date could not be attributed (solely) to CAFA.
The second condition is the magnitude of the change in the postCAFA period. Not to put too fine a point on it, a dramatic increase in
the number of diversity class actions filed in or removed to federal

84 Preliminary data provided by the Office of Court
Research (OCR) of the Administrative Office of Courts in California indicate a decrease in class activity in seven
California superior courts during the first year in which CAFA was in effect. FJC researchers found that during the same year (2005), class action activity increased markedly in the four California-based federal district courts. FED.JUDICIAL CTR., supra note
76, at 4-5. These preliminary data suggest the type of analysis that will be possible
when further data become available.
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court would provide stronger evidence for a CAFA effect than a less
dramatic increase. If diversity class actions are observed to double in a
short span of time, for example, it seems unlikely that the cause was a
doubling of overall class action activity in the state and federal courts
in that short time span. One would think that such a massive increase
in total class action activity, in a short period of time, would have produced banner headlines. In other words, it is unlikely that the only
evidence for a massive increase in overall class action activity in the
state and federal courts, combined, would be an increase in federal
diversity filings and removals. At a minimum, a dramatic increase in
filings and removals in a short span of time makes it more likely that
the increase was caused by CAFA than other factors.
Moreover, a dramatic change in filings and removals will more
likely reflect a CAFA effect if the change also reflects a break with preCAFA filing and removal patterns. An increase in filings post-CAFA,
for example, would provide stronger evidence for a CAFA effect if filings had not been increasing prior to the Act's effective date.
For the most part, federal question class action filing and removal
patterns should not be affected by the legislation and thus should not
change post-CAFA. Class actions raising federal-law causes of action
were not affected directly by CAFA. The federal courts had jurisdiction over such cases before CAFA, and the statute did not alter the parameters of that jurisdiction in any way. It is possible, however, that
CAFA may increase the number of federal question original proceedings indirectly, at the margins. Pre-CAFA, plaintiffs may have avoided
pleading federal causes of action to prevent or defeat removal to federal court. Post-CAFA, the possibility of successful removal on diversity grounds by defendants is greater, so plaintiffs may have less reason
to avoid federal causes of action in drafting their pleadings. In other
words, plaintiffs' attorneys may reason that, if they file in state court
and avoid federal causes of action, they will get removed anyway, and
thus will decide to plead federal and state claims together and file in
federal court. Any such indirect CAFA effect should be seen in original proceedings based on federal question jurisdiction only. There is
little reason to expect that CAFA will affect the number (as opposed
to the timing) of federal question removals in any systematic way.
Phase II of the study will examine the claims raised in federal question
class actions to determine whether plaintiffs were more likely to raise
state causes of action in federal filings post-CAFA.
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B. PreliminaryFindings
1. Filings and Removals
This section presents preliminary findings from the FJC study to
date. The logical place to begin is with all class action activity in the
federal courts during the study period. Figure 1 presents an area
graph of monthly class action filings (original proceedings) and removals, separated out by basis ofjurisdiction,85 from July 2001 through
June 2006. The vertical line dissects the area at February 2005, the
month in which CAFA became law. The post-CAFA period is to the
right of the vertical line. As the figure clearly shows, overall class action activity in the federal courts increased across the study period, as
the number of monthly filings and removals of class actions generally
increased from around 200 per month in late 2001 to more than 300
per month during several months in 2005 and 2006. Interestingly, the
single largest number of filings and removals (n = 376) was observed
in March 2005, the first full month after CAFA's effective date.
As Figure 1 makes very clear, most class actions in the federal
courts are federal question original proceedings, a category of cases
that should not be directly affected by CAFA. The pattern in federal
question original proceedings, overall, is interesting. The clear trend
pre-CAFA was an increase in such filings, with the number of monthly
filings positively correlated with time (r = 0.467, p < 0.001). In the
post-CAFA period, however, this trend seems to have stalled, and the
number of monthly filings of federal question class actions is not correlated with time (r=0.025, p = 0.892). 816 In other words, for some reason, federal question original proceedings were increasing prior to
CAFA, but have leveled off since it became law (as of June 30, 2006).
This is in absolute numbers, not as a proportion of all class action activity, so this trend is not related to CAFA increases in other types of
class actions. As will be seen in the next section, a large part of the increase in federal question original proceedings was actually driven by

85

All figures included in this Article omit the relatively small number of class ac-

tions in which federal jurisdiction was based on the fact that the United States was the
defendant (U.S. Defendantjurisdiction).
86 Here r is Pearson's correlation coefficient, which ranges from -1, for a
perfect
inverse relationship between the variables, to +1, for a perfect relationship between
them, with 0 (zero) meaning no relationship (correlation); p is the probability of finding the correlation by chance in a population without an underlying correlation, included for tests of statistical significance. This information is included only to identify
the trends in the data.
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an increase in labor class (or collective) actions under the FLSA, 87
which have leveled off in the most recent months for which data is
currently available. Federal question removals have remained a relatively steady, if small, part of the total class action activity throughout
the study period.
Figure 1: Monthly Class Action Filings and Removals,
by Basis of Jurisdiction, July 2001-June 2006
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Figure 1 clearly indicates that the number of diversity class actions
filed in or removed to the federal courts increased in the post-CAFA period. Because of the scale of the figure, it is difficult to gauge the increase. Figure 2 presents the same information, for diversity cases only.
The overall pattern obvious in Figure 2 is consistent with the hypothesis that CAFA led to an increase in the number of diversity class
actions filed in and removed to the federal courts. The levels to the
left of the vertical line, which represent the numbers of such cases, by
month, pre-CAFA, are much lower than those to the right of the line.
Indeed, the mean number of monthly diversity filings and removals,
pre-CAFA, was 28; the mean number post-CAFA was 56, or double the

87

29 U.S.C. § 213 (2000).
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pre-CAFA figure. That difference of means provides strong evidence
for a CAFA effect on filings and removals of diversity cases.
Figure 2: Monthly Class Action Filings and Removals,
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Only,
July 2001-June 2006
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Figure 2 shows a second interesting pattern. In the pre-CAFA period, most diversity class actions in the federal courts were removed
from the state courts. Although the number of removals declined in
2004, the pre-CAFA trend was for diversity removals to outnumber diversity original proceedings. This suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys in
the pre-CAFA period generally chose to file class actions raising statelaw causes of action in the state courts and that defendants were removing some unknown percentage of these to federal court. In the
post-CAFA months, however, the number of diversity original proceedings increased dramatically. Although both diversity removals
and original proceedings increased, comparing the pre- and postCAFA periods, the greater increase is observed in the original proceedings. Pre-CAFA, the average number of monthly removals of diversity class actions was 16.6; post-CAFA, the comparable figure was
23.7, an increase of, on average, about 7 class actions. But pre-CAFA,
the average number of monthly original proceedings of diversity class
actions was 10.8; post-CAFA, the comparable figure was 31.5, an increase of about 20 class actions per month.
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This finding strongly suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys in a large
number of cases were choosing, post-CAFA, to file class actions raising
state-law causes of action in the federal courts, a marked departure
from the pre-CAFA period. This is further illustrated in Figure 3,
which plots a three-month moving average for both types of cases
across the study period. (The three-month moving average is intended
only to smooth the jagged lines; it does not alter the substantive findings.)
Figure 3: Monthly Class Action Filings and Removals,
Diversity of Citizenship Only, Three-Month Moving Average,
July 2001-June 2006
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As seen in Figure 3, diversity removals were actually declining in
number and as a share of all diversity class actions in the federal
courts in the pre-CAFA period. The number of monthly removals of
diversity cases is negatively correlated with time (r = -0.559, p = 0.001),
pre-CAFA. By way of comparison, the number of monthly diversity
original proceedings was not correlated with time (r = 0.013, p =
0.935). For some reason, diversity removals were declining before
CAFA, to the point that the number of such cases was essentially the
same as the number of diversity original proceedings, which had held
steady for the pre-CAFA period. As discussed in Part III.A.3, supra,the
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sharp break with the pre-CAFA trends, coinciding with CAFA's effective date, provides strong evidence of a CAFA effect.
Both removals and original proceedings of diversity class actions
increased in the post-CAFA period, but, as seen in Figure 3, original
proceedings have remained at their new, much higher level (or perhaps increased somewhat in the last months), while removals have
tailed off. In fact, the monthly number of removals in the last months
for which data is currently available is similar to many months of the
pre-CAFA period. The pattern for removals was one of decline, preCAFA, then a sharp increase immediately following CAFA, followed by
another decrease, post-CAFA, to roughly pre-CAFA (and pre-2004)
levels. In the post-CAFA period, the monthly number of diversity removals is again negatively correlated with time (r = -0.410, p = 0.030),
and the monthly number of diversity original proceedings is again not
correlated with time, at least at traditional levels of statistical significance (r= 0.262, p = 0.162).
This analysis provides support for the conclusion that the federal
courts have seen an increase in diversity removals and, especially,
original proceedings in the post-CAFA period as a result of the expansion of the federal courts' diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The
dramatic nature of the increase, again especially in diversity original
proceedings, provides further support for the conclusion that CAFA is
the cause of the observed trends. It is unlikely that the doubling in
diversity class actions reflects a comparable increase in underlying
class action activity in the state courts in such a short period of time.
Moreover, the apparent change in plaintiffs' attorney filing decisions
also supports the view that CAFA is driving the observed patterns.
The Center is continuing to collect filing and removal data in order to determine whether the observed post-CAFA trends are long
lasting or merely temporary. But in the short run, at least, it appears
that CAFA has led to an increase in class actions raising state-law
claims in the federal courts.
The next section addresses the types of cases comprising the diversity class actions in the federal courts and identifies the categories
of such cases in which increased filings and removals have been identified since CAFA was enacted.
2. Nature-of-Suit Categories
The next question is what kinds of cases account for the observed
increases in diversity filings and removals. Figure 4 presents an area
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graph of diversity filings and removals grouped into the following nature-of-suit categories: Contracts, Consumer Protection/Fraud, TortsProperty Damage, Torts-Personal Injury, Civil Rights, and Other. It is
clear in Figure 4 that much of the increase in diversity filings and removals has been driven by a large increase in the number of state-law
Contracts actions filed in or removed to the federal courts. Comparing monthly filings, the mean number of such class actions increased
from around 14 per month pre-CAFA to more than 30 per month
post-CAFA. As discussed above, this doubling in the number of Contracts actions in the federal courts could be the result of factors unrelated to CAFA, but the dramatic nature of the change, coinciding with
CAFA's effective date, strongly suggests that CAFA is the cause of at
least some of the observed increase.
Figure 4: Monthly Class Action Filings and Removals,
Diversity of Citizenship Only, by Nature-of-Suit Category,
July 2001-June 2006
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Consumer Protection/Fraud actions also increased in the postCAFA period. This category of cases, in the diversity context, is comprised largely of class actions brought under state consumer protection statutes, such as California Business and Professional Code sec-
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tion 17200.88 Before CAFA's enactment, the federal courts saw very
few such class actions, averaging only 2.7 filings and removals per
month. In the post-CAFA period, the mean number of monthly filings and removals of Consumer Protection/Fraud class actions based
on state law increased to around 10 per month, more than tripling.
Although 10 class actions per month is not that many relative to the
overall caseload of the federal courts, the observed increase does suggest that CAFA is shifting some class actions based on state-law causes
of action from the state courts to the federal courts.
Although the increase is less stark, and thus less clear, in Figure 4,
the number of Torts-Property Damage class actions based on diversity
jurisdiction also saw an increase in the post-CAFA period. Pre-CAFA,
there were, on average, 2.5 such class actions filed in or removed to
the federal courts per month. Post-CAFA, the mean monthly filings
and removals of these class actions have increased to 5.9 per month.
Although Contracts, Consumer Protection/Fraud, and TortsProperty Damage class actions have all increased in numbers in the
federal courts in the post-CAFA period, there has been no change in
the monthly filings and removals of Torts-Personal Injury class actions
in the study period. Indeed, the mean number of Torts-Personal Injury class actions filed in or removed to the federal courts was 7.1 per
month both before and after CAFA's effective date. This part of the
federal docket appears to have been unaffected by passage of CAFA,
which is somewhat unexpected. Even if jurisprudential developments
in recent years have made it less likely that plaintiffs' attorneys would
file personal injury class actions in the federal courts, one would have
expected that defendants would have taken advantage of expanded
federal diversity jurisdiction to remove such cases initiated in the state
courts. That this does not appear to have occurred may signal some
frustration of congressional intent (assuming that Torts-Personal Injury class actions are being filed at the state court level).
The four categories of diversity class actions discussed above make
up the bulk of diversity class actions in the federal courts. Figure 4
also shows two other categories of class actions, Civil Rights and
Other, about which little need be said. There are too few state-law
Civil Rights class actions in Figure 4 to analyze separately--only 20
Civil Rights class actions coded as based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction were found in the entire study period. The vast majority of
Civil Rights class actions in the study involved federal law. The Other
88

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
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category consists mostly of cases for which there is inadequate information on the nature of the case in the IDB to assign the cases to a
nature-of-suit category. It is interesting that the number of such
Other diversity class actions filed in or removed to the federal courts
also appears to have increased in the post-CAFA period.
Figure 5: Monthly Class Action Filings and Removals,
Federal Question Jurisdiction Only, by Nature-of-Suit Category,
July 2001-June 2006
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For purposes of comparison and completeness, we have also prepared an area graph displaying the nature-of-suit categories comprising the federal question class actions that have been identified in the
study. As discussed with respect to Figure 1, the pattern in Figure 5
shows an increase in the number of federal question class actions
overall in the pre-CAFA period and then a leveling off of federal question class action activity in the post-CAFA period. Several categories of
federal question cases have held relatively constant across the entire
study period; the relatively small number of Contracts, Torts-Property
Damage, and Torts-Personal Injury class actions based on federal
question jurisdiction has not changed significantly in the post-CAFA
period. But some trends are apparent in Figure 5, most notably the
increases in Labor and Consumer Protection/Fraud class actions, especially in the pre-CAFA period.
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Both Labor and Consumer Protection/Fraud class actions
reached their highest observed level in 2005, the year in which CAFA
became law. But that, in itself, is not evidence of a CAFA effect. The
trend for both nature-of-suit categories in the pre-CAFA period had
been decidedly upward; for both nature-of-suit categories in the preCAFA period, the monthly filings and removals variable was positively
correlated with time (Labor, r = 0.844, p < 0.001; Consumer Protection/Fraud, r = 0.367, p = 0.016). That the highest level of such cases
is seen in the year of CAFA's enactment may be an artifact of that
trend alone. Moreover, since CAFA's effective date, neither category
of case has continued to increase. In the post-CAFA period, the
monthly filings and removals variable is not correlated with time for
either category of class action (Labor, r- -0.142, p = 0.600; Consumer
Protection/Fraud, r = -0.100, p - 0.712). It appears that, as of June
2006, both categories have leveled off at this new, higher level of
monthly filings and removals.
It is not possible at present to say that CAFA did not affect the
number of filings of Labor and Consumer Protection/Fraud cases
based on federal question jurisdiction. As discussed in Part III.A.3,
supra, it may be that some of the increase in the numbers of such cases
filed or removed after CAFA's effective date is accounted for by plaintiffs' attorneys filing class action complaints raising claims arising under federal statute in the post-CAFA period when they would have
avoided raising federal claims prior to the Act's effective date to avoid
or defeat federal jurisdiction. In Phase II of the study, we will compare the nature of claims raised in federal question class action complaints before and after CAFA to determine whether plaintiffs' attorneys were more likely, post-CAFA, to raise state-law claims in federal
question cases. Such a finding would provide support, albeit indirect,
for the notion that CAFA has affected federal question filings as well
as diversity filings and removals.
3. Circuit-Level Analysis
To this point, we have analyzed CAFA's potential impact nationwide. But it is likely that CAFA's impact will vary from circuit to circuit. In the words of one federal district judge, "it is safe to predict
that [after CAFA] the parties will continue to engage in strategic behavior when it comes to choosing a forum."8 9 Plaintiffs may exercise

89

Vance, supra note 42, at 1642.
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their choice of forum by filing class actions as original actions in a district court within the circuit that they view as having favorable procedural and legal rules, geographic connection to the litigation, or
judges that they perceive to be predisposed to rule in favor of class
certification.
Defendants in turn may exercise their removal rights
in accordance with their own strategic perceptions about favorable
procedural and legal rules and judicial predispositions."'
Figure 6: Diversity Class Action Filings and Removals, by Circuit,
Comparing Twelve-Month Periods Before and After
CAFA's Effective Date
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Figure 6 compares the number of diversity filings and removals in
the district courts in each circuit in calendar year 2004 and in the last
twelve months for which data is presently available, July 2005 through
June 2006. The figure clearly shows that class action activity based on
diversity of citizenship increased in the district courts in every circuit,
post-CAFA. This suggests that CAFA, to date, has affected courts nationwide, although some courts have seen greater increases in diversity caseloads than others. Diversity filings and removals were at least
twice as high in July 2005 through June 2006, compared to calendar
year 2004, in eight of the twelve circuits: the D.C., First, Second,

90 See Willging & Wheatman, Attony Choice, supra note 37, at 607-15.
91 See id. at 615-18.
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Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The district courts
in the Third Circuit experienced almost a fourfold increase between
the two periods, and those in the Ninth Circuit more than a fivefold
increase in diversity filings and removals.
Figure 6 does not address which party chose the federal forum,
however. Diversity class action activity would be observed to increase
in the district courts in a circuit if plaintiffs' attorneys were choosing,
post-CAFA, to file more state-law class actions in those districts. Indeed, given the discussion related to Figures 2 and 3 above, that must
have occurred in a number of district courts, at least. But diversity
class action activity would also be observed to increase if defendants
were removing more cases to federal court after CAFA, as well. Figure
7 presents the percentage change in both removals and original proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction between calendar year 2004
and July 2005 through June 2006, organized by circuit. This figure
sheds some light on which party has been choosing the federal forum
in the post-CAFA period in each circuit.
Figure 7: Percentage Change in Removals and Original Proceedings,
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Only,
Comparing Twelve-Month Periods Before and After
CAFA's Effective Date
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As seen in Figure 7, in four circuits the percentage increase in
removals, post-CAFA, was greater than the percentage increase in
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original proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction. In the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, it appears that the observed increase
in class action activity based on diversity jurisdiction has been driven
by defendants choosing to remove more class actions from the state
courts in the post-CAFA period. The Seventh Circuit saw removals
more than double between the two periods, and the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits saw almost threefold increases in removals between the
two periods, without experiencing anything resembling a comparable
increase in original proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction. But
seven circuits experienced larger percentage increases in original
proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction between the two periods
than in removals based on diversity jurisdiction. In the D.C., Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the observed increase in class action activity based on diversity jurisdiction appears to
have been driven largely by plaintiffs' attorneys' initial choice of a
federal forum.
At present, we are unable to offer an explanation for the different
patterns observed in the circuits. Of course, filing and removal patterns have complex causes. But differences in circuit law with respect
to class certification and similar issues probably explain some of the
observed patterns. In October 2007, ProfessorJohn Coffee and Stefan
Paulovic commented on recent developments in class certification in
the circuits, concluding that "the relevant standards appear to be varying with the Circuit, with the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits taking
a more liberal stance [i.e., more likely to certify a class] than other
Circuits, while the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits generally seem
the most conservative [i.e., least likely to certify a class]." 2 Based on
this expert analysis, and assuming that plaintiffs' attorneys will tend to
file class action complaints where the law is more favorable to class
certification, one would expect to see large percentage increases in
diversity original proceedings in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits and smaller increases in the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
This expectation is not completely borne out by the data. The
Fifth Circuit, which Coffee and Paulovic identify as one of the more
"conservative" circuits with respect to class certification, actually experienced one of the largest percentage increases in class action filings. Of course, the relevant period almost certainly contains litigation arising from insurance disputes related to Hurricane Katrina,

92 John C. Coffee Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification:
Developments over the Last
Five Years 2002-2007, 8 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) S-787, S-819 (Oct. 26, 2007).
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which, generally speaking, would be filed in a district in the Fifth Circuit. This is a useful reminder, perhaps, that circuit law is only one
factor in the plaintiffs' attorney's decision of where to file a class action. Still, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits all experienced
large percentage increases in diversity original proceedings between
the two periods, which suggests that circuit law with respect to class
certification does, indeed, factor into a plaintiffs' attorney's decision
about which federal forum to choose.
Based on the Coffee and Paulovic commentary, moreover, one
would expect to see large percentage increases in the removal of class
actions based on diversity jurisdiction in the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. Again, this expectation receives mixed support from
the data. Consistent with expectations, the Seventh Circuit did experience more than a doubling of class action removals based on diversity jurisdiction between the two periods, which suggests that defendants in the districts in that circuit were taking advantage of
expanded diversity jurisdiction to remove cases in the post-CAFA period. The Fifth Circuit actually saw a percentage decrease in removals
between the two periods, although this finding may be closely related
to the increase in diversity filings in that circuit. (Given the sharp increase in the number of diversity filings in the district courts in the
Fifth Circuit between the two periods, it would be especially interesting to know how many class actions were filed in the state courts in
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi and not removed to federal court
during this period.) The Fourth Circuit saw only modest increases in
both removals and original proceedings, as seen in Figure 6.
IV. QUESTIONS FOR CONTINUING RESEARCH

The findings described in Part III.B provide strong support for the
conclusion that CAFA has caused the number of diversity class actions
filed in and removed to the federal courts to increase appreciably.
These findings are consistent with commonly held expectations of the
legislation's probable effects, though more modest than some of the
predictions and extrapolations discussed in Part II.B. We leave the
normative implications of these findings to others-it is beyond our
role to answer the query, put by the organizers of this Symposium,
"fairness to whom?" But a number of important empirical questions
remain, with respect both to filings and removals and to litigation activity in the identified class actions.
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The first question for additional research is, simply put, what is
happening in the state courts post-CAFA? As discussed in Part III.A.3,
the lack of equivalent state court data on class action filings means
that the ongoing FJC study cannot speak to several issues of importance in understanding CAFA's overall impact. We have identified the
class actions removed to the federal courts, but we do not know what
percentage of class actions filed in state court are removed. Has the
removal rate (the number of removals divided by the number of class
actions in state court) increased, post-CAFA? The increase in removals compared to the immediate pre-CAFA period suggests that it has,
but we just do not know. Similarly, we do not know whether the increase in original proceedings in diversity class actions has coincided
with a comparable decrease in the filing of class actions in the state
courts. In analyzing CAFA's overall impact, these are important questions. The lack of state court data on class actions stems from multiple sources, including the lack of necessary resources to collect the
data in the state systems and the lack of common computerized case
management systems. This is clearly, however, a promising avenue of
research for enterprising and energetic scholars. We would enthusiastically cooperate with such researchers. Systematic and reliable information about state court class action activity would not simply
round out the research presented here, it would greatly inform the
policy debate.
The second set of questions involves the permanence of CAFA's
effects on the federal system: Will the trends we have observed to date
continue? Will diversity class actions continue to be filed in the federal courts at the new, higher level? Will diversity removals continue
to trend downward in the post-CAFA period? There is reason to think
that the expansion of the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction will have
lasting consequences. But additional research is needed to determine
how plaintiffs and defendants adjust their filing and removal strategies
in the post-CAFA period. As discussed in Part III.A, the ongoing FJC
project is currently collecting data on filings and removals from July 1,
2006, through June
30, 2007. Analysis of that data will shed some light
• 93
on these questions.

93 For a preliminary report on those data, see
THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G.
LEE 1Ii, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITFEE ON CIVIL RULES (2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/cafaO4O8.pdf/$file/cafaO4O8.pdf.

1764

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156:1723

The third set of questions, discussed in Part III.A, involves what
happens in class action cases once they are filed in or removed to federal courts. The FJC research team is now collecting data on a wide
range of litigation activities in a sample of the class actions in Phases II
and III of the study. Analysis of these data, when complete, will shed a
great deal of light on how CAFA has affected class actions in the federal courts, from the nature and sources of the causes of actions raised
in complaints, to the residences of class members, to class settlement
practices, to appellate review of class certification rulings. Key questions relate to the composition of class membership in class actions
filed in or removed to federal courts. How effective has CAFA'sjurisdictional filter been in retaining multistate class actions in federal
courts and not disturbing state court jurisdiction over single-state class
actions? Again, state court data would illuminate this set of questions
as to cases that remain in or are remanded to state courts. Federal
data will shed direct light on the residences of class members for class
actions certified by federal judges. In addition to increasing the
caseload of the federal courts, has CAFA increased the courts' workloads as well? The answers to these questions, in turn, will inform the
judicial branch's administrative and rulemaking response to CAFA
and might even affect the judicial branch's evaluation of any need for
additional resources or for proposing amendments to Rule 23 or to
CAFA.

